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The Melt-down of the Global Economy: A Keynes-Minsky Episode?*
Sunanda Sen
The mayhem which started in the de-regulated financial markets of US in the autumn of 2008 engulfed, by early 2009, the real as well as the financial sectors in the global economy at large. The crisis has not only deepened but also has been continuing since then. A development as serious as above makes it imperative that it is still relevant to analyse, once again, the circumstances which can explain this catastrophe.
What can trigger a financial crisis? Some Theoretical

Concerns
Tracing back the origin of the on-going crisis and its manifestation in the global economy, we draw attention to the following two facets in the changing institutional structure of de-regulated financial markets :
The first concerns the growing uncertainty as can be witnessed in these liberalised financial markets while the second relates to financial engineering with innovations in these markets, simultaneously providing cushions against risks while generating sources of liquidity which remain beyond the conventional sources.
* I thank Gary Dymski and Atulan Guha for useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I also than Byasdeb Dasgupta and Soumya Kanti Ghosh for useful suggestions on the earlier draft.
Dealing with the first aspect which concerns the growing uncertainty in de-regulated markets, it sets the pace of investments by affecting expectations on the future value as well as the returns on assets. One can here observe the connections between investment and finance, both subject to influence with changes in the state of expectations. Of these we can mention the initial formulation which can be traced back to Keynes's General Theory (1936) With demand for assets the risks of borrowing, which tends to be subjective, rises with increased leveraging while for suppliers of assets costs of borrowing and fees etc add to the current replacement cost of assets. A 'margin of safely' is thus fixed on a subjective basis in the process, with the demand price for new assets lower than the current price for old assets by the 'margin of safety'. The supply price similarly accounts for the respective safety margin by adding the latter to the replacement cost of assets at current market prices. In this process uncertainty and the related state of subjective expectations continue to have a significant role.
Purchase of assets ( or investment) will thus continue until the demand price is above the supply price. Incidentally, like in the Keynesian formulation, the Tobinesque 'q' also fails to consider the above links of credit finance on investment decisions. 3 We will deal later with the implications of above in the context of the current crisis.
Minsky's characterisation of de-regulated financial markets however does not consider the other institutional aspects which concern the non-bank sources of credit and the 2 HymanMinsky, StabilisinganUnstableEconomyYaleUniversityPress1986pp183-196 SeealsoforacleardistinctionbetweentheKeynesian'Investmenttheoryofcycles'andtheMinskian 'FinancialTheoryofInvestment'anditsexposition,L.RandallWrayandEricTymoigne,"Macroeconomics MeetsHymanMinsky:TheFinancialTheoryofInvestment"TheLevyEconomicsInstituteofBardCollege WorkingPaper543.Septemvber2008 involvement of banks themselves in the capital market under universal banking. As it has been pointed out, it is far more important for banks and non-bank financial entities to follow the 'originate and distribute' model where packaging of assets and their sales along with the shifting of risks to counterparties generates more profits that is possible from the simple 'commitment models' which rely on the spread at the loan officer's desk. 4 As it has been pointed out, the Minsky world today relates to a "bygone era"when credit used to be created only in the loan offices of banks. 5
The changing pattern of the financial transactions brings us back to the second factor which contributed to trigger the global financial crisis. It relates to financial engineering with innovations in de-regulated financial markets. credit creation beyond the usual banking orbits were soon discovered by the market by relying on financial innovations like derivatives for the purpose. In the event, a large number of US firms were able to access short-term credit by making use of securitised assets as collaterals. These were treated in the market as commercial papers. 10 The wave of these asset based securitisation (ABS) was followed by new forms of financial intermediation as investment banks were repackaging in order to market these securities easily to other banks or non-bank financial units. Transactions as above facilitated the churning of these multiple asset-backed securities (ABS), generated on the basis of the original (or the underlying) asset, while propping up multiple counterparties which held those assets. Leveraging played a major role in the creation of these debt financed assets, which continued as long as there was trust and confidence in the uncertain markets on these newly created financial assets.
Since these transactions were outside the orbit of conventional banking channels, the Fed had no regulatory power over those. Instead these deals were subject to the jurisdictions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of USA which had very little power to regulate . As a consequence there resulted as a consequence in a 50% decline With the housing market targeting the section of US citizens, so-far excluded from the financial markets by banks on grounds of race and/or income, and with the risk-weighted creditrationing, 12 it became an opportune moment for banks and other non-bank intermediaries to venture out to these new markets.
Possibilities as above to securitize the mortgaged assets opened up new channels of investments, for the brokermortgage firms, the issuers and insurers of asset based securities(ABS), investment banks who readily purchased and repackaged the ABS , and other financial institutions. Each, by acquiring an asset, were able to leverage by obtaining credit against the latter.
As the process continued, a large number of American citizens with low incomes were now endowed with a mortgaged property and a liability to pay monthly instalments, usually to the broker-mortgager cum bank which organised the deal. Assets as above were backed by loans which later were discovered as 'subprime', with the mortgaged collaterals subject to valuation in a sliding market, loans offered at interest rates which were higher than those ruling in the market, and with little accountability of the borrowers, many of whom were not bankable in terms of the conventional practices followed earlier. The euphoria , fed initially by the rising property prices on the one hand and the eagerness on part of the financial community to profit by using the securitisation route on the other (which temporarily shifted the risk to counterparties), did work as long as it lasted. All this business, led by investment banks, as we have mentioned above, was outside the purview of the Fed , and the SEC hardly stepped in to interfere.
To follow the sequence that led to the recent sub-prime crisis of the US we provide below a rough sketch of the possible links in the system:
The schema of sub-prime loans as above which prompted the upswing in the asset market eventually failed to work in USA.
As mentioned earlier, the high property prices of mid-1990s made it possible for banks to advance loans against mortgaged houses at high interest rates to low income borrowers who had very little credentials in the financial market.
Repackaging of these to back securities (which exchanged hands to generate further assets and credit opportunities) 
where L, L R and L F are the respective liquidity demands, in aggregate, for real assets and for financial assets.
Given the state of financial engineering in a de-regulated financial sector, we assume that liquidity demand always adjusts to its supply, both under boom situations and under slump.
Defining the asset demand in the two sectors, 
where A_ F < 0
To find out the asset market behaviour for the economy as a whole, we need to look at the changes in the total value of assets Q. The latter , if positive, will let the market continue without a crash. Alternatively the economy crashes with a collapse of the asset market. Let us spell out, using
(1) to (6) (8) ).
Thus dQ will continue to be positive even under uncertainty when its negative impact on value of financial assets will be more than compensated by the positive contribution of real sector to total asset value in the economy. This however will never be achieved when even the real sector assets fail to perform, which is a situation of an overall catastrophe.
However, there remain situations where the financial sector may continue to have positive returns while the real sector fails to perform, a situation visible in the advanced countries during the eighties. In such cases, the positive contribution of the financial sector on asset value has to continuously compensate for the negative impact of liquidity demand in the real sector on the value of assets therein.
Unlike what is assumed in (3) above, here a rise in credit flows ( ) fails to raise the value of real assets (A r ). But on the whole credit flows fail to contribute to an improved value of assets (Q) in the economy as a whole. As mentioned above, this is a typical case which prevailed in the advanced economies since the mid-eighties, with the boom in the financial sector failing to revive the stagnating real sector.
As it happened in more recent times, the financial boom in the global economy ( and especially in the OECD) could not last in absence of investment with real asset formation. As we have pointed out elsewhere, a financial boom, unless backed by real investments, amounts to financial market activities which are fed by speculation alone. 13 These transactions in the secondary market entail multiple transfers of titles or claims (financial assets ) which are backed by the same stock ,against real assets issued in the primary market. It does not require much to explain that these bubbles in the financial sector often has no counterpart in the real sector, and that these continue as long as expectations are self-fulfilling.
The latter proves difficult to fulfil in practice as more and 13 SunandaSen,GlobalFinanceatRisk:OnRealStagnationandInstabilityPalgrave-Macmillan2003pp8,50-51 more liquidity is pumped in to acquire these financial assets with the expectation of achieving high returns which eventually fail to be realised.
Conclusion
The intensity of the severe economic crisis across the world which at present is continuing, especially in the real sector, makes it urgent to seek remedial steps. The world has witnessed the limits of financialisation as a sustainable path of economic sustenance. One needs to recreate the base for real expansion by re-orienting the pattern of investment incentives, possibly with direct controls on speculation, and with a move away from the high-risk high-return profits in speculation to the ground reality of real expansion in the global economy.
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